England\u27s Contaminated Land Act of 1995: Perspectives on America\u27s Approach to Hazardous Substance Cleanups And Evolving Principles of International Law by Healy, Michael P.
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles Law Faculty Publications 
1998 
England's Contaminated Land Act of 1995: Perspectives on 
America's Approach to Hazardous Substance Cleanups And 
Evolving Principles of International Law 
Michael P. Healy 
University of Kentucky College of Law, healym@uky.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Michael P. Healy, England's Contaminated Land Act of 1995: Perspectives on America's Approach to 
Hazardous Substance Cleanups And Evolving Principles of International Law, 13 J. Nat. Resources & 
Envtl. L. 289 (1998). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more 
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
England's Contaminated Land Act of 1995: Perspectives on America's Approach 
to Hazardous Substance Cleanups And Evolving Principles of International Law 
Notes/Citation Information 
Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1998), pp. 289-315. 
This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/471 
ENGLAND'S CONTAMINATED LAND ACT OF 1995:
PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICA'S APPROACH TO
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE CLEANUPS AND EVOLVING
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
MICHAEL P. HEALY*
The approaches that other legal systems take to solving
important legal problems may provide insights into the strengths and
weaknesses of the approaches that our own legal system takes to those
same problems. These insights may be particularly instructive in
situations in which the other legal system has taken a different approach
because our own approach has been perceived as flawed.
An important contemporary problem in environmental
regulation concerns the cleanup of property that is an unfortunate
legacy of the modem industrial age-acres of land affected by past
inadequate disposals of toxic substances.' The United States began to
address this problem in 1980 with the enactment of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA).2 CERCLA establishes both a liability regime for assigning
the costs of cleaning up lands contaminated by the release of hazardous
substances3 and regulatory requirements defining how those cleanups
are to be pursued.' In 1995, England enacted the Contaminated Land
Act (alternatively referred to as the CLA),5 its first effort to address
comprehensively the cleanup of land contaminated by hazardous
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. JD. 1984, University of
Pennsylvania; B.A. 1978, Williams College. Preparation of this article was supported by the
University of Kentucky College of Law through a summer research grant. The author began work
on this article while he was a Visiting Lecturer at Coventry University, England, and wishes to
thank Bob Gingeil, a member of the Coventry University faculty, for his helpful comments on an
earlier draft. The author also thanks Blake Homal, Class of 1999, for his work as research
assistant.
'See Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under
CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 65, 67 & n.2 (1992) (discussing
estimate that the cost of cleaning up releases of hazardous substances in the United States will
reach $500 billion).
242 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980). CERCLA was amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(1986).
'See infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
4See infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
5Environmental Act of 1995, Ch. 25, § 57 (Eng.) (adding new Part IIA to the
Environmental Protection Act of 1990) [hereinafter CLA §§ 78A-78YC].
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substances.6 England's new approach to the cleanup of contaminated
land was determined in part by its government's view that CERCLA
defined regulatory provisions that are too controversial and costly.7
Close consideration of the CLA should accordingly provide
rich insights into an alternative approach to remediating contaminated
land. In addition to providing an important perspective for
reconsidering America's approach to the remediation of contaminated
land, England's CLA also should be considered along with CERCLA
in a less parochial legal context, that is in the context of international
environmental law. Observers of the rapid development of international
environmental law have made claims that several important principles
have evolved that are broadly accepted by all nations.' National
legislation may therefore be examined to assess the extent to which it
adheres to these purportedly generally accepted principles. The
Contaminated Land Act, as well as our own national law of
contaminated land cleanup, can be most profitably assessed by
reference to two broadly accepted evolving principles-the
precautionary principle9 and the polluter-pays principle." Insights can
also be gained by considering the extent to which the two statutory
schemes reflect in the treatment of their own citizens two evolving
international law principles that govern international relations-the
principles of adequate consultation" and nondiscrimination.
This Article will compare and contrast the CERCLA regime for
remediating contaminated land with the CLA's principal provisions and
'he history of the adoption of this legislation is summarized in Jenny Steele, Remedies
and Remediation: FoundationalIssues in Environmental Liability, 58 MOD. L. REv. 615, 615-25
(1995). Prior to the enactment of the CLA, England had relied on statutory nuisance powers to
address contaminated land problems. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, THE WELSH
OFFICE & THE SCOrrISH OFFICE, CONSULTATION ON DRAFT STATUTORY GUIDANCE ON
CONTAMINATED LAND 2 (Sept. 1996). England also provided in 1990 for the use of public
registers of contaminated land, although that approach was never implemented. See Steele, supra,
at 624.
7
See HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
REMEDYING ENVIRONMENT DAMAGE 10-11, 14-15 (1993-94 Session 3d report) (14 Dec. 1993);
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, RESPONSE
TO THE COMMUNICA1ION FROM THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (COM(93)47
FINAL) GREEN PAPER ON REMEDYING ENVIRONMENTAL (Oct. 8, 1993).
'See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW I:
FRAMEWORKS, STANDARDS AND IMPLEMENTATION 183 (1995); DAVID HUNTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 318-26 (1998).
'See infra Part I.
'°See infra Part 11.
"See infra Part IIl.
2See infra Part IV.
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requirements. This discussion will be organized by reference to the
four emerging principles of international environmental law.
I. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND THE CLEANUP OF
CONTAMINATED LAND
A. A Brief Description of the Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle is the term that is used to describe
the important shift in environmental law from a regime that required a
showing of actual harm to human health or the environment before a
regulatory response could be pursued to a regime that permits or
requires a regulatory response when harm to human health or the
environment is threatened." In American law, a commonly recognized
illustration of this shift involves the litigation resulting from discharge
of tailings into Lake Superior by the Reserve Mining Company in the
1970s. 4 A panel of the Eighth Circuit had initially concluded that an
injunction barring the company's discharges should be stayed pending
appeal because there had been no showing of actual harm, but only "a
bare risk of the unknown."' 5 After the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc
heard the appeal on the merits, the court concluded that a remedy was
available because the discharge of mill tailings presented a threat of
harm to human health, and such a threat was actionable under the
applicable statutory provision.16 The decision of the federal Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA'7
developed this approach by articulating the position that endangerment
required a consideration of both the likelihood of an injury and the
extent of the threatened injury. A precautionary regulatory response
was proper based on a balancing of the likelihood and the extent of the
threatened injury.'8
The similar approach taken by these courts has now become
firmly established as a principle not only of American statutory' 9 and
"INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 21-24 (Anthony D'Amato &
Kirsten Engel eds. 1996).
"See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
"Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 498 F.2d 1073, 1084 (8th Cir. 1974).
"See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d at 535-42.
"Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
"Id. at 5-6.
"See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (Clean Water Act provision authorizing abatement
action when pollution presents "an imminent and substantial endangerment"); 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a)
(similar abatement authority under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. §
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common law,"0 but also of international environmental law. The
principle is recognized in important recent treaties,"' as well as by
commentators.2 The fact that this principle is now well recognized and
established does not mean that it is noncontroversial and simply
applied. The precautionary principle and the related application of risk
analysis in environmental law have been the subject of discussion and
discord both domestically" and internationally. 4
B. CERCLA's Strong Adherence to the Precautionary Principle
In the context of contaminated land regulation, CERCLA
adheres very strongly to the precautionary principle. Adherence can
perhaps be seen most clearly in three features of the statutory structure.
First, the statute's applicability, that is the authority to pursue cleanups,
is triggered quite easily. When contamination by a hazardous substance
is implicated, cleanup may be pursued when the hazardous substance
"is released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the
environment."2  The statute accordingly is based on the policy
determination that any release of hazardous substances, indeed any
significantly threatened release of such substances, necessitates
precaution in the form of a permitted administrative response.
Second, the precautionary principle is implicit in the standards
that must be met for cleanups pursued under CERCLA. Final cleanups,
7603 (similar abatement authority under the Clean Air Act).
2°See, e.g., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (I11. 981)
(allowing relief for a prospective nuisance based on potential harms associated with the disposal
of hazardous substances).2 See SANDS, supra note 8, at 208-13 (discussing adoption of the principle in several
treaties). 22See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 360-63.23See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980) (decision exploring the requisite showing of endangerment required for a regulatory
response under the federal workplace safety statute). Domestic reluctance to adhere strongly to
the precautionary principle can also be seen in the state programs for voluntary cleanup of
brownfields. These programs permit residual risks to remain at sites that have been cleaned up for
redevelopment. See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
4See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle,
33 ENV'T 4 (1991), excerpted in HUNTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 361-63. International reluctance
to adhere strongly to the precautionary principle can also be seen in the mixed reaction to
international efforts to address the problem of global climate change by limiting emissions of
greenhouse gases. See Peter Newell, A Changing Landscape of Diplomatic Conflict: The Politics
of Climate Change Post- Rio, in THE WAY FORWARD: BEYOND AGENDA 21, 37 (Felix Dodds ed.,
1997). 7 242 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). If the substance is not hazardous, then the release or
threatened release of the pollutant or contaminant has to "present an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or welfare" to permit a response action. Id.
[VOL. 13:2
CONTAMINATED LAND ACT OF 1995
or remedial actions, pursued under the statute must "assure[ ] protection
of human health and the environment."26 This health standard is met
through the requirement that a remediated site comply with standards
identified in other environmental statutes that are "legally applicable...
or relevant and appropriate under the circumstances" (ARARs)."
Moreover, with respect to site remediation, CERCLA establishes a
preference for permanent, treatment-based remedies.28 Because such
remedies are more expensive,29 CERCLA indicates that protection of
health and the environment is more important than savings that might
be accomplished by allowing the mere capping and closure of a site.
CERCLA's third and final important indicator of its strong
adherence to the precautionary principle is itsjudicial review preclusion
provision.3" That provision has the effect of postponing issues of
liability for cleanups until after the site has been cleaned up at least
initially and any threat to human health or the environment has been
abated. The provision conforms to the precautionary principle, because
it commits affected parties to cleaning up hazardous substances before
concerns about cleanup liability may be addressed in litigation.
C. The CLA's Limited Adherence to the Precautionary Principle
The three indicia of adherence to the precautionary principle
discussed with regard to CERCLA may be used to contrast the
regulatory approach of the Contaminated Land Act and that statute's
implicit rejection of CERCLA and its strong adherence to the
precautionary principle.
2642 U.S.C. § 9621 (d)(1). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245
(1986) ("remedial actions must assure protection of human health and the environment."),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3337.
2742 U.S.C. § 9621 (d)(2)(A)(i). See generally Michael P. Healy, The Effectiveness and
Fairness of Superfund's Judicial Review Preclusion Provision, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 278-79
(1995-96).
2'42 U.S.C. § 962 1(b)(1).
29See Healy, supra note 27, at 276.
3042 U.S.C. § 9613(h). This provision is discussed in detail in Healy, supra note 27,
and in Michael P. Healy, Judicial Review and CERCLA Response Actions: Interpretive Strategies
in the Face of Plain Meaning, 17 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (1993).
1997-98]
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1. The Trigger for Applicability of the CLA: The "Significant
Harm" Standard
The CLA defines contaminated land as:
any land which appears to the local authority in whose
area it is situated to be in such a condition, by reason
of substances in, on or under the land, that-
(a) significant harm is being caused or there is a
significant possibility of such harm being caused; or
(b) pollution of controlled waters is being, or is likely
to be, caused.. 31
This trigger differs in several important ways from the
CERCLA trigger. Rather than the straightforward standard of a release
(or significant threat of a release) of any hazardous substance, the CLA
requires proof that conditions at the site are causing "significant harm"
or a "significant possibility of such harm." 2 To be sure, the latter
showing is a type of endangerment, but it likely requires too much in
the way of both quantity of harm and likelihood of harm than would
typically be required under the precautionary principle. The CLA's
alternative standard effectively permits an inference of "significant
harm" from actual or "likely" pollution of controlled waters.3  Again,
3.CLA §78A(2).
2Other provisions indicate that the "significant harm" standard is to be applied broadly.
CLA §78A(4) defines "harm" broadly to include "harm to the health of living organisms or other
interference with the ecological systems of which they form part and, in the case of man, includes
harm to his property." Regarding the definition of contaminated lands, the CLA provides that the
effects of sites may be aggregated to meet the contaminated land standard:
(1) Where it appears to a local authority that two or more different sites,
when considered together, are in such a condition, by reason of substances
in, on or under the land, that--
(a) significant harm is being caused or there is a significant possibility of
such harm being caused, or
(b) pollution of controlled waters is being, or is likely to be, caused,
this Part shall apply in relation to each of those sites, whether or not the
condition of the land at any of them, when considered alone, appears to the
authority to be such that significant harm is being caused, or there is a
significant possibility of such harm being caused, or that pollution of
controlled waters is being or is likely to be caused.
CLA §78X(1).
33The statute, however, includes a narrow definition of when waters are affected by
contaminated land by requiring actual pollution or a likelihood of pollution of controlled waters.
See CLA §78A(8) ("Controlled waters are "affected by" contaminated land if (and only if) it
appears to the enforcing authority that the contaminated land in question is, for the purposes of
subsection (2) above, in such a condition, by reason of substances in, on or under the land, that
[VOL. 13:2
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the less stringent CERCLA standard should permit cleanups in some
cases before contamination of water resources is threatened by release
of hazardous substances into the environment. In short, although the
CLA's trigger may not require actual harm before the statute will apply,
it is far less precautionary than CERCLA in identifying land as
contaminated.34
The Contaminated Land Act's trigger for the regulation of so-
called "special sites" is set at even a higher level. The statute grants the
Secretary of State power to define these special sites" and indicates that
the key considerations for defining contaminated land as a special site
are the following:
(a) whether land of the description in question appears
to him to be land which is likely to be in such a
condition, by reason of substances in, on or under the
land that-
(i) serious harm would or might be caused, or
(ii) serious pollution of controlled waters would be, or
would be likely to be, caused; or
(b) whether the appropriate Agency is likely to have
expertise in dealing with the kind of significant harm,
or pollution of controlled waters, by reason of which
pollution of those waters is being, or is likely to be caused.").
3Regulations to be issued under authority of the statute will further determine how
precautionary the statute will be as it is implemented. The statute grants the Secretary of State
significant power to promulgate binding guidance on the definition of significant harm. The CLA
provides that the Secretary of State is to issue guidance on the "questions -
(a) what harm is to be regarded as 'significant',
(b) whether the possibility of significant harm being caused is 'significant',
(c) whether pollution of controlled waters is being, or is likely to be caused."
CLA §78A(6) provides further that, when defining significance, the Secretary of State has
authority to make a broad range of distinctions:
(6) Without prejudice to the guidance that may be issued under subsection
(5) above, guidance under paragraph (a) of that subsection may make
provision for different degrees of importance to be assigned to, or for the
disregard of,-
(a) different descriptions of living organisms or ecological systems;
(b) different descriptions of places; or
(c) different descriptions of harm to health or property, or other interference
CLA §78 A(6).
1
5CLA §78C(1O).
1997-981
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land of the description in question is contaminated
land.1
6
Land defined as a "special site" because it causes "serious harm" or
"serious pollution of controlled waters" is subjected by the
Contaminated Land Act to special national oversight." This national
control over land that poses special risks to public health may be
compared to the special federal interest in the most serious CERCLA
sites included on the National Priorities List (NPL).38 Indeed, as the
CERCLA statutory regime has evolved, sites posing less significant
threats to public health that are not included on the NPL have become
the focus of state and local interest,"° with applicable requirements
often being less stringent than the standards of CERCLA.
4 °
2. CLA Standards for Permitted Remediation: The
"Reasonable Measures" Limitation and Risk-Based Cleanup
As with the threshold determinations for designation as
contaminated land or a special site, which depend on assessments ofthe
degree of harm threatened by substances in, on, or under the property,
the Contaminated Land Act modifies the precautionary approach to
defining appropriate remediation measures.4' Once property has been
designated as a special site or identified as contaminated land, the CLA
36 "(10) Without prejudice to the generality of his power to prescribe any description
of land for the purposes of subsection (8) above, the Secretary of State, in deciding whether to
prescribe aparticular description of contaminated land for those purposes, may, in particular, have
regard to-
(a) whether land of the description in question appears to him to be land which is likely to be in
such a condition, by reason of substances in, on or under the land that--
(i) serious harm would or might be caused, or
(ii) serious pollution of controlled waters would be, or would be likely to be, caused; or
(b) whether the appropriate Agency is likely to have expertise in dealing
with the kind of significant harm, or pollution of controlled waters, by reason
of which land of the description in question is contaminated land." CLA §78C(10).
"CLA §78Q regulates the remediation of special sites. CLA §78Q(l) provides that,
for special sites, the national agency may adopt the remediation notice served by the local authority
for the contaminated land. CLA §78Q(2) provides that, if a local authority has itself begun to take
remediation action, it may proceed with the remediation action at the special site, as well as have
cost recovery authority. Finally, §CLA 78Q(3) grants the appropriate national Agency continuing
periodic inspection authority with respect to special sites.
"See Healy, supra note 27, at 277.
"See GNERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-66, SUPERFUND: STATE
VOLUNTARY PROORAMS PROVIDE INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE 28-29 (Apr. 1997).
4°See id. at 24.
4CLA §78A(7) defines "remediation" broadly to include assessment, cleanup, and post-
cleanup monitoring.
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requires the "enforcing authority" to "serve on each person who is an
appropriate person a notice (in this Part referred to as a 'remediation
notice') specifying what that person is to do by way of remediation and
the periods within which he is required to do each of the things so
specified."42 The enforcing authority also must pursue reasonable
consultation with directly affected persons prior to serving this
remediation notice.43
The Contaminated Land Act imposes significant limitations on
the remediation that may be required by a notice. Most importantly, the
CLA identifies the basic framework for evaluating remediation
activities and that framework permits the government to require only
"reasonable measures" based on the consideration of the costs of and
seriousness of harm prevented by the proposed remedial action."' To
42CLA §78E(l).
41 "(1) Before serving a remediation notice, the enforcing authority shall reasonably
endeavor to consult-
(a) the person on whom the notice is to be served,
(b) the owner of any land to which the notice relates,
(c) any person who appears to that authority to be in occupation of the whole or any part of the
land, and
(d) any person of such other description as may be prescribed,
concerning what is to be done by way of remediation." CLA §78H.
CLA §78H(4) provides an exception to the consultation requirement and the timing
prohibitions in cases of imminent serious danger. This provision may be analogized to the limited
consultation for removal actions under Superfund. See Healy, supra note 27, at 274-75. The
Contaminated Land Act also grants remediation authority directly to the enforcing authority when
remediation is necessary to prevent imminent danger of serious harm or serious pollution of
controlled waters (i.e., standards for special site). See CLA §§78N(1), (3).
The CLA also provides specifically that a remediation notice "may require an
appropriate person to do things by way of remediation, notwithstanding that he is not entitled to
do those things." CLA §780(1). This requirement is enforced by requiring that "[any person
whose consent is required before any thing required by a remediation notice may be done shall
grant, or join in granting, such rights in relation to any of the relevant land or waters as will enable
the appropriate person to comply with any requirements imposed by the remediation notice." Id.
§ 2. This provision is broadly analogous to CERCLA's entry authority provision. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(e).
Regarding this consent requirement, the statute does provide that reasonable efforts
should be made to consult with any parties that must grant consent prior to serving the remediation
notice (CLA §78G(3)), although this advance consultation is not required in "in any case where
it appears to the enforcing authority that the contaminated land in question is in such a condition,
by reason of substances in, on or under the land, that there is imminent danger of serious harm, or
serious pollution of controlled waters, being caused." Id. § 78G(4). CLA §78G(5) also entitles any
person who is required to give consent to recover compensation from an appropriate person.
4' "(4) The only things by way of remediation which the enforcing authority may do,
or require to be done, under or by virtue of this Part are things which it considers reasonable,
having regard to-
(a) the cost which is likely to be involved; and
(b) the seriousness of the harm, or pollution of controlled waters, in question."
CLA §78E(4).
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implement this "reasonable measures" limitation, the Act provides the
Secretary of State with authority to promulgate binding guidance on the
following critical remediation issues:
(a) what is to be done (whether by an appropriate
person, the enforcing authority or any other person) by
way of remediation in any particular case,
(b) the standard to which any land is, or waters are, to
be remediated pursuant to the notice, or
(c) what is, or is not, to be regarded as reasonable for
the purposes of subsection (4) above.4 5
The Act reconfirms this central "reasonable measures"
limitation when it defines several circumstances in which the enforcing
authority is not permitted to serve a remediation notice. The first such
circumstance is when the authority concludes that no reasonable
remediation measures are available to be taken given the costs and
benefits of such measures.46
Thus, unlike CERCLA, which mandates that remedial actions
eliminate all threats to human health,"' the CLA requires only
remediation that is cost effective. The latter statute accordingly allows
risks to human health that amount to "significant harm," when the costs
of eliminating those risks are too high. This market-driven regulatory
scheme undercuts the precautionary principle because high cleanup
costs should prove easier to quantify than the uncertain risks posed by
continued exposure to low levels of toxic chemicals.4"
Consistent with its standard for permitted remediation
activities, England has adopted a risk-based approach to defining the
appropriate standards for clean-up. Interestingly, the CLA does not
itself expressly define clean-up standards for the remediation of
.5CLA §78E(5).
4CLA §78H(5)(a). CLA §78H(6) requires the enforcing authority to prepare a
"remediation declaration" explaining the reasons why it has not required remediation measures
based on its evaluation of the costs and benefits associated with such measures.
4'See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
'Because it allows continued, but not significant, risks ofexposure to toxic substances,
the CLA is similar to the cleanup standards developed by states in their brownfields programs. See
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 39, at 35-42. Professor Steele has written that the
CLA's cleanup standard establishes only a liability rule, rather than a property rule, to protect
against the effects of hazardous substance releases because it relies on market efficiency to
determine whether cleanup is warranted. See Steele, supra note 6, at 631.
[VOL. 13:2
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contaminated land.49 Rather, the CLA provides the Secretary of State
with authority to promulgate binding guidance on "the standard to
which any land is, or waters are, to be remediated pursuant to the
[remediation] notice."5 Government policy articulated both prior to5'
and after 2 enactment of the Contaminated Land Act, however, has
indicated that the government will take a "suitable for use" approach to
cleanup standards: "the standard of remediation required will be that
appropriate to the current use, rather than restoration of land to a pre-
industrial state, or to render it fit for any or all possible future uses. 53
Again, the CLA, unlike CERCLA, is driven by market-based
concerns about reasonable levels of cleanup, rather than a paramount
purpose of eliminating the potential risks to human health that are posed
by hazardous substances in the environment. CERCLA's required use
of ARARs and strong preference for permanent remedies mean that the
statute's approach is far more precautionary than the CLA, which seems
more concerned that money not be wasted in eliminating risks
unnecessarily.
3. Appeal of the Remediation Notice Under the CLA
CERCLA's required delay in the litigation of issues related to
liability or required cleanup measures has been understood as necessary
to meet Congress's goal of speeding cleanups and limiting the threats
to human health posed by releases of hazardous substances. 4 The
approach of the CLA differs greatly. The statute provides that a person
who receives a remediation notice has a right to appeal that notice
within twenty-one days of its receipt."5 Moreover, the CLA gives the
"9One possible inferential standard identified by the statute is that remediation may be
required to eliminate contamination only to the degree necessary to eliminate the land's status as
contaminated land.
mCLA §78E(5)(b).
' See DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND WELSH OFFICE, FRAMEWORK FOR
CONTAMINATED LAND: OUTCOME OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
FROM THE CONSULTATION PAPER PAYING FOR OUR PAST 4 (Nov. 1994).
2
DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, THE WELSH OFFICE & THE SCOTTISH OFFICE,
CONSULATION PAPER-CONTAMINATED LAND-DRAFT REGULATIONS AND REGULATORY
ASSESSMENT, Appendix B, at 6 (Nov. 1996).
"3 Id. See also Steele, supra note 6, at 623-24 & 636.
"See Healy, supra note 27, at 289-91.
5' "(1) A person on whom a remediation notice is served may, within the period of
twenty-one days beginning with the day on which the notice is served, appeal against the notice--
(a) if it was served by a local authority, to a magistrates' court or, in Scotland, to the sheriff by
way of summary application; or
(b) if it was served by the appropriate Agency, to the Secretary of State;
1997-98]
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appellate authority the power to quash, modify, or confirm the
remediation notice, as well as the authority to extend the compliance
periods. 6 In short, the CLA permits immediate litigation on issues of
liability and remediation and grants courts significant review authority.
Not only is litigation required to be brought shortly after receipt
of the remediation notice, claimants are also more likely to succeed in
their litigation. Success is more likely because the liability standards,
the standard triggering application of the CLA, and the remediation
standards impose important constraints on permitted government
actions.
In sum, since its adoption in 1980, CERCLA has adhered
strongly to the precautionary principle. England's more recent cleanup
program, adopted in 1995, as well as recently adopted state brownfields
programs, appear, however, to have departed from the precautionary
principle. In particular, the recently adopted programs allow residual
risks to remain after remediation of the contaminated lands.
II. THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE AND LIABILITY FOR THE
CLEANUP OF CONTAMINATED LAND
A. A Brief Description of the Polluter-Pays Principle
The polluter-pays principle is intended to define a
straightforward standard for imposing liability in cases of damage to the
environment." As a principle of international environmental law, this
standard would impose liability on any party that has acted to cause the
environmental damage.5" The polluter-pays liability standard has the
effect of internalizing the costs of environmental degradation.59
and in the following provisions of this section 'the appellate authority' means the magistrates'
court, the sheriff or the Secretary of State, as the case may be." §CLA 78L(l).
CLA §78L(4) provides that regulations "may make provision" for manymatters relating
to these appeals, including "the grounds on which appeals under subsection (1) above may be
made."
56 "(2) On any appeal under subsection (1) above the appellate authority--
(a) shall quash the notice, if it is satisfied that there is a material defect in the notice; but
(b) subject to that, may confirm the remediation notice, with or without modification, or quash
it.
(3) Where an appellate authority confirms a remediation notice, with or without modification, it
may extend the period specified in the notice for doing what the notice requires to be done." CLA
§78L.
"For general discussions of the sources and significance of the polluter-pays principle,
see SANDS, supra note 8, at 213-17; HUNTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 382-85.
"
8
See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 382.
"See id.
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Without this standard, environmental costs may be mere externalities
that the polluter can ignore in determining the level of its
environmentally-degrading activities and the price of its products."0
B. The Polluter-Pays Principle and the CERCLA Liability Scheme
Although Congress did not refer directly to this principle when
it adopted CERCLA in 1980, the CERCLA liability scheme is a
paradigmatic polluter-pays scheme of liability. That scheme imposes
strict," joint and several62 liability on several classes of potentially
responsible parties (PRPs).63 These groups are present owners or
operators of a facility," past owners or operators at the time of disposal
at the facility,65 parties that arranged for disposal of the hazardous
substances (so-called generators),66 transporters of the hazardous
substances,67 and secured creditors that have participated in the
management of the facility from which there has been a release of
hazardous substances.6"
With one exception, CERCLA's five classes of responsible
parties are defined on the basis of active involvement in causing the
contaminated land problem.69 The exception is the current owner or
operator category, which may include parties that have no active
responsibility for having placed hazardous substances on the land. For
example, some current owners or operators may have purchased
property after the time when hazardous substances were placed on the
"See id.; SANDS, supra note 8, at 213.
"See Healy, supra note 1, at 86-87.
62See id. at 102-03.
6'See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
-Id. § 9607(a)(1).
65Id. § 9607(a)(2).
-Id. § 9607(a)(3).
671d. § 9607(a)(4).
6"See id. § 9601(20)(E)(i).
6"T7his active-involvement requirement is reinforced by the limited defenses available
against CERCLA liability. See id. § 9607(b), Those defenses arise when the contamination results
from an act of God, an act of war, or an act of certain independent third parties. See id. Moreover,
the enforcement policy of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) narrows the scope of
transporters of hazardous substances that are subjected to CERCLA liability based on the nature
of their active involvement with the disposal. EPA "will not seek to impose liability upon
transporters that did not select the disposal site, so long as they cooperate in providing information
about their transportation activities to the agency." JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS 0. MCGARITY,
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CASES - LEGISLATION- POLICIES 967 (2d ed. 1992).
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land without knowing that the polluting substances were present.
These parties may nevertheless be broadly characterized as polluters,
because releases from their property are causing present harms to the
environment. Moreover, including these "passive" polluters within the
liability scheme may also be defended as consistent with the polluter-
pays principle, because the broad scope of liability prevents parties
from avoiding liability merely by transferring title to the property.71 In
addition to forcing the internalization of the costs of land
contamination, Congress intended that present owner or operator
liability would ensure full investigation into the environmental
condition of property before interests in property would be
transferred. 2
Consistent with the reasons for the international principle of
polluter pays, Congress believed that the broad scheme of CERCLA
liability would have several important effects. First, it would impose
a uniform strict standard of liability for hazardous waste disposal
activities, which would deter unreasonably risky conduct in the disposal
of hazardous substances.73 Second, the standard would internalize the
costs of accidents associated with hazardous substance activities and
thereby ensure that those that profit from hazardous substances will
bear all costs associated with producing and disposing of those
substances.74 Third, the statute's broad liability scheme would ensure
that the public would only have to bear the costs associated with
inadequate disposal as a last resort when those directly connected with
the environmental harm were not available. 5
C. The CLA's Limited Adherence to the Polluter-Pays Principle
To assess the CLA's adherence to the polluter-pays principle,
one must consider the liability scheme defined by the statute. Section
78B(3) of the CLA prescribes the scope of the notification requirement
that applies when contaminated land has been identified. Those to be
'Some of these present owners may be able to rely on the innocent purchaser exception
to owner liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35). The exception, added to the statute in 1986, applies,
inter alia, when a person acquires a facility after a disposal of hazardous substances has occurred
and that person had no reason to know after completing a reasonable environmental audit that
hazardous substances were present. See id.
"See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
"See Healy, supra note 1, at 87-88.
"See id at 77-79.
'See id at 79-80.
5See id. at 99-102.
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notified are the appropriate national agency, the land owner, any
occupier of the land, and any "appropriate person." '76 The last category
is critical to the liability determination and is defined in Section 78F.
Indeed, Section 78F(1) provides that the section has "the purpose of
determining who is the appropriate person to bear responsibility for any
particular thing which the enforcing authority determines is to be done
by way of remediation in any particular case."77
The presumptively appropriate person for bearing the costs of
remediation is defined by Section 78F(2) to be any polluter, that is:
"any person, or any of the persons, who caused or knowingly permitted
the substances, or any of the substances, by reason of which the
contaminated land in question is such land to be in, on or under that
land."78 By defining the class of responsible, "appropriate person[s]"
to include those "who caused or knowingly permitted" the
contamination, the CLA appears to impose liability in a manner
consistent with the polluter-pays principle. Unlike CERCLA, however,
liability for cleaning up contaminated land is not presumptively joint
and several. Rather, Section 78F(3) provides that the liability of
polluters must be allocated based on the following causation principle:
(3) A person shall only be an appropriate person.., in
relation to things which are to be done by way of
remediation which are to any extent referable to
substances which he caused or knowingly permitted to
be present in, on or under the contaminated land in
question.79
1. CLA Limitations on Liability and the Polluter-Pays
Principle
Notwithstanding its apparent conformity with the polluter-pays
principle, the CLA establishes three important limitations on liability
76 "(3) Ifa local authority identifies any contaminated land in its area, it shall give
notice of that fact to--
(a) the appropriate Agency;
(b) the owner of the land;
(c) any person who appears to the authority to be in occupation of the whole or any part of the
land; and
(d) each person who appears to the authority to be an appropriate person . CLA §78B(3).
"CLA §78F(1).
7 CLA §78F(2).
79CLA §78F(3).
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that reflect a more modest adherence to the principle than, for example,
the CERCLA liability scheme. First, the CLA provides that, in cases
of multiple appropriate parties, the local authority must apportion the
costs of remediation among appropriate persons, based on guidance to
be issued by the Secretary of State." This apportionment authority
includes the authority to decide that an appropriate party-a statutory
classification that includes only polluters-will not have to bear any
costs of remediation.8
Second, the CLA requires that there be consideration of
hardship in defining the extent of liability of appropriate persons.
Section 78P(2) requires that the enforcing authority consider the
hardship to any appropriate person, as well as guidance by the Secretary
of State, when determining the extent of recovery for remediation costs
that it should seek.12  By exercising this discretion, the enforcing
authority may allow a polluter to avoid having to pay for part of the
remediation costs, despite the fact that those costs may be affordable,
though borne with hardship. Limiting liability under these
"CLA §§78F(6), (7). CLA §78F(!0) provides that the apportionment of costs need not
be precise with respect to the costs of cleaning up specific contaminants:
(10) A thing which is to be done by way of remediation may be regarded
for the purposes of this Part as referable to the presence of any substance
notwithstanding that the thing in question would not have to be done-
(a) in consequence only of the presence of that substance in any quantity;
or
(b) in consequence only of the quantity of that substance which any
particular person caused or knowingly permitted to be present.
S "(6) Where two or more persons would, apart from this subsection, be appropriate
persons in relation to any particular thing which is to be done by way of remediation, the enforcing
authority shall determine in accordance with guidance issued for the purpose by the Secretary of
State whether any, and if so which, of them is to be treated as not being an appropriate person in
relation to that thing.
(7) Where two or more persons are appropriate persons in relation to any particular thing which
is to be done by way of remediation, they shall be liable to bear the cost of doing that thing in
proportions determined by the enforcing authority in accordance with guidance issued for the
purpose by the Secretary of State-" CLA §§78F(6), (7).
Consistent with these provisions, CLA §78E(3) provides that, in cases in which "two
or more persons are appropriate persons in relation to any particular thing which is to be done by
way of remediation, the remediation notice served on each of them shall state the proportion,
determined under section 78F(7) below, of the cost of doing that thing which each of them
respectively is liable to bear."
"2 "(2) In deciding whether to recover the cost, and, if so, how much of the cost, which
it is entitled to recover under subsection (i) above, the enforcing authority shall have regard-
(a) to any hardship which the recovery may cause to the person from whom the cost is
recoverable; and
(b) to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this subsection." CLA
§78P(2).
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circumstances would undermine the cost internalization purpose of the
polluter-pays principle.
The third and final important limitation on the polluter-pays
principle is that the CLA makes key distinctions between the
circumscribed liability that applies to the current owner or operator who
is a passive polluter and the broader liability applicable to the actively-
polluting current owner. The CLA bars the imposition of liability on
a present owner, who is not an active polluter, except in limited
circumstances. The Act establishes rules of liability in situations in
which there is no active polluter, either generally or as to the need for
the incurrence of particular expenses of remediation.8 3 In such
circumstances, "the owner or occupier for the time being of the
contaminated land in question is an appropriate [i.e., liable] person,"
either for all or for specific expenses." Moreover, Section 78K limits
the remediation responsibilities of the owner or occupier of land
contaminated by the migration of substances from other land to the
remediation of the owner or occupier's own land.8" Section 78K
applies only when the owner or occupier "has not caused or knowingly
permitted the substances in question to be in, on or under that land. ' 6
In such cases, the remediation notice served on the owner or occupier
may not require remediation of the land from which the contamination
has escaped onto the owner or occupier's land 7 or of any other land
that may be contaminated by the escape of those substances."s Unlike
CERCLA, the CLA thus limits the liability of the owner or occupier
who is a passive polluter.
For the actively polluting owner, Section 78P of the CLA
provides special reimbursement rules that apply to any request for
83 See CLA §§78F(4), (5).
' "(4) If no person has, after reasonable inquiry, been found who is by virtue of
subsection (2) above an appropriate person to bear responsibility for the things which are to be
done by way of remediation, the owner or occupier for the time being of the contaminated land
in question is an appropriate person.
(5) If, in consequence of subsection (3) above, there are things which are to be done by way of
remediation in relation to which no person has, after reasonable inquiry, been found who is an
appropriate person by virtue of subsection (2) above, the owner or occupier for the time being of
the contaminated land in question is an appropriate person in relation to those things." CLA
§§78F(4), (5).
"CLA §78K.
MId. §78K(3Xb).
"Id. §§78K(2), (3).
"Id. §78K(4). CLA §78K(6) permits the enforcing authority to perform remediation
in addition to the remediation permitted by this subsection. The authority may not recover the
costs ofperforming that remediation from the owner or occupier who could not have been required
to perform the remediation under the other provisions of this section.
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reimbursement or "charging notice" 9 that is served on an actively
polluting owner of contaminated land. Section 78P(3)(a) defines such
an owner as:
a person
(i) who is the owner of any premises which consist of
or include the contaminated land in question; and
(ii) who caused or knowingly permitted the substances,
or any of the substances, by reason of which the land
is contaminated land to be in, on or under the land;..
90
The amount prescribed in a charging notice to such an owner is defined
to be a charge on the premises. 9' An appeal of a charging notice may
be brought to a county court within twenty-one days of the date of
service. 92 The county court then has authority to confirm, modify, or
"order that the notice is to be of no effect."'93 Regulations may be
promulgated that define "the grounds on which appeals under this
section may be made."'94
A final difference between the rules for owner liability under
CERCLA and the CLA relates to the treatment of purchasers of
property who, despite the exercise of proper diligence, failed to learn
that the land they purchased had been contaminated. As was discussed,
CERCLA provides innocent purchasers of contaminated land with a
defense to liability for cleanup costs.95 The CLA, however, provides a
less comprehensive defense to liability for the costs of cleanup. It
grants a subsequent innocent purchaser an exception from liability for
other property affected by contamination from that owner's
contaminated land.96 The subsequent purchaser is still responsible,
however, for remediation of the contaminated property that was
purchased.97
89CLA §78P(3)(b).
90CLA §78P(3)(a).
"See CLA §78P(7).
921d. §78P(8).
"Id. §78P(9)(c).
94Id. §78P(10)(a).
"See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
"CLA §78K(5).
"' "(5) In any case where--
(a) a person ("person A") has caused or knowingly permitted any substances to be in, on, or under
any land,
(b) another person ("person B") who has not caused or knowingly permitted those substances to
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In sum, CERCLA's liability scheme conforms quite closely to
the polluter-pays principle by broadly imposing liability on those who
are active or passive polluters. The CLA has narrowed the scope of
liability. Most importantly, the CLA allows polluters to avoid liability
when the government decides that imposing liability would cause an
unwarranted hardship.
III. PROCEDURES FOR CONTAMINATED LAND CLEANUPS AND THE
PRINCIPLE OF ADEQUATE CONSULTATION
A. The Principle of Adequate Consultation
One of the most broadly-accepted emerging principles of
international environmental law is that nations must consult adequately
with other nations when they plan to take action that may significantly
affect the environment of those other nations.98 This principle has its
source in America's National Environmental Policy Act," which
required the federal government to prepare a public environmental
impact statement assessing the environmental impacts of a proposed
be in, on or under that land becomes the owner or occupier of that land, and
(c) the substances, or any of the substances, mentioned in paragraph (a) above appear to have
escaped to other land,
no remediation notice shall require person B to do anything by way of remediation to that other
land in consequence of the apparent acts or omissions of person A, except to the extent that person
B caused or knowingly permitted the escape." CLA §78K(5).
CLA §78J(1) provides that CLA §78J applies in situations in which land meets the
contaminated land definition because pollution of controlled waters is being or is likely to be
caused. In such cases, the fallback responsibility provision, which imposes remediation
responsibility on an owner or occupier in the absence of another appropriate party, is limited to the
responsibilityto eliminate significant harm and not to eliminating all pollution of controlled water
that is caused by the contaminated land. The CLA provides specifically that:
(2) Where this section applies, no remediation notice given in consequence
of the land in question being contaminated land shall require a person who
is an appropriate person by virtue of section 78F(4) or (5) above to do
anything by way of remediation to that or any other land, or any waters,
which he could not have been required to do by such a notice had
paragraph (b) of section 78A(2) above (and all other references to pollution
of controlled waters) been omitted from this Part.
CLA §78 J(2).
CLA §78J(3) establishes asimilar limitation on the scope ofremediation responsibility
that applies to any person who has permitted pollution of controlled waters by mine drainage from
an abandoned mine. This limitation on liability does not apply, however, to water pollution caused
by mine drainage from a mine that is abandoned after December 31, 1999. Id. §78J(4).
9See SANDS, supra note 8, at 197-98, 579 & 594; HUNTERETAL., supra note 8, at 374-
78.
'National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 - 4370c. See SANDS,
supra note 8, at 579 (identifying NEPA as the source of the consultation principle).
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action before the government could act in a way that would
significantly affect the quality of the human environment.'00
Although nations and international law commentators would
likely disagree about the precise obligations that this principle imposes
on nations,' there would likely be agreement that the minimum
obligation is to provide potentially affected nations with information
about environment-altering actions in the planning stage and to allow
an opportunity for those nations to comment on the proposed actions. 2
Those comments would permit the potentially affected nations to
advocate alternate actions or mitigation measures.'0 3
B. CERCLA and Consultation with Affected Parties
CERCLA's consultation requirements differ significantly,
depending on whether a removal action or a remedial action is being
pursued. Generally, removal actions are interim abatement actions to
minimize the risks of hazardous substance releases."° Such actions
must generally be completed in less than one year at a cost of less than
two million dollars.0 5 These actions may generally be pursued without
the need for a substantial consultation process."° Remedial actions, on
the other hand, are intended to provide a permanent remedy for the
release of hazardous substances. 7 Remedial actions, which are far
more costly than response actions,' are subject to significant
procedural requirements defined in Section 117 of CERCLA.'09 Those
requirements are designed to ensure involvement of the affected public
as well as state officials in the selection of the remedy."0 The public
is given the opportunity to review and present comments on the
proposed remedial plan before a final plan can be defined. "i That final
plan need not accept the public's suggestions for modifying the
proposals for remediation, but there must be a response to any such
1-42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
1
'See SANDS, supra note 8, at 579 & 594.
"
02
See HUMTR ET AL., supra note 8, at 377.
"
03
See id.
°See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23); see generally Healy, supra note 27, at 274-75.
"O'See id at 275 & n.22.
"'See id at 275 & n.23.
"'0See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24); see generally Healy, supra note 27, at 275-80.
"nSee Healy. supra note 27, at 276 (average costs ofremedial actions are "between $25
and $30 million per site").
"'42 U.S.C. § 9617.
"'See Healy, supra note 28, at 278 n.46.
"'See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a).
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suggestions, including reasons why proposed modifications were not
made."'
CERCLA's procedural approach seems quite consistent with
the international principal of adequate consultation. Except in
circumstances when exigencies allow no opportunity for consultation,
CERCLA requires that there be a disclosure of proposed plans, an
opportunity for comment on that planning, and a response to those
comments.
C. CLA Provisions for Public Disclosure and Consultation
The CLA does not include specific requirements designed to
ensure public involvement in defining necessary remediation. The CLA
is unclear with respect to both the identity of people who will be
consulted and the extent of the consultation. The Act requires that the
enforcing authority pursue reasonable consultation with directly
affected persons prior to serving the remediation notice." 3 Whether
this group includes the affected public, including those residing nearby
the contaminated land, depends on how broadly the statutory category
of "any person of such other description as may be prescribed"'' 4 is
interpreted in regulations. Regarding the nature of consultations, the
CLA is wholly silent. The Act does not require, for example, that there
be an opportunity to review and comment upon proposed plans for
remediation before they are finalized. If regulations implementing the
statute include the affected public, including those residing nearby the
contaminated land, within the directly-affected-persons category and
define reasonable consultation to include an opportunity for comment
on proposed remediation plans, then the statute as implemented will
generally conform to the principle of adequate consultation.
The CLA includes a limitation on the reasonable consultation
requirement in cases in which the contaminated land poses "imminent
"'Id. § 9617(c).
"3 "(1) Before serving a remediation notice, the enforcing authority shall reasonably
endeavour to consult-
(a) the person on whom the notice is to be served,
(b) the owner of any land to which the notice relates,
(c) any person who appears to that authority to be in occupation of the whole or any part of the
land, and
(d) any person of such other description as may be prescribed,
concerning what is to be done by way of remediation." CLA §78H(I).
'"Id. §78H(l)(d).
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danger of serious harm."' . This limitation seems quite similar to
CERCLA's limitation on public consultation with regard to removal
activities." 6 The limitation seems appropriate in reflecting the need for
prompt action in circumstances when the public health or the
environment are threatened with imminent harm.
In the event that regulations implementing the statute do not
extend the reasonable consultation requirements to the affected or
interested public, the public's interest in information about remediation
under the CLA is met only by the statutorily mandated register of
information. The CLA requires the enforcing authority to maintain a
register of information about implementation of the statute, including,
for example, remediation notices and appeals against those notices." 7
The statute also provides that this register must be open for public
inspection."' Although this public register requirement does ensure
1' "(4) Neither subsection (1) nor subsection (3) above [relating to the timing of
remediation notices] shall preclude the service ofa remediation notice in any case where it appears
to the enforcing authority that the land in question is in such a condition, by reason of substances
in, on or under the land, that there is imminent danger of serious harm, or serious pollution of
controlled waters, being caused." CLA §78H(4).
"6See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
"7 "(1) Every enforcing authority shall maintain a register containing prescribed
particulars of or relating to--
(a) remediation notices served by that authority;
(b) appeals against any such remediation notices;
(c) remediation statements or remediation declarations prepared and published under section 78H
above;
(d) in relation to an enforcing authority in England and Wales, appeals against charging notices
served by that authority;
(e) notices under subsection (1)(b) or (5)(a) of section 78C above which have effect by virtue of
subsection (7) of that section as the designation of any land as a special site;
(f) notices under subsection (4)(b) of section 78D above which have effect by virtue of
subsection (6) of that section as the designation of any land as a special site;
(g) notices given by or to the enforcing authority under section 78Q(4) above terminating the
designation of any land as a special site;
(h) notifications given to that authority by persons-
(i) on whom a remediation notice has been served, or
(ii) who are or were required by virtue of section 78H(8)(a) above to prepare
and publish a remediation statement,
of what they claim has been done by them by way of remediation;
(j) notifications given to that authority by owners or occupiers of land--
(i) in respect of which a remediation notice has been served, or
(ii) in respect of which a remediation statement has been prepared and published,
of what they claim has been done on the land in question by way of remediation;
(k) convictions for such offences under section 78M above as may be prescribed;
(I) such other matters relating to contaminated land as may be prescribed;
but that duty is subject to sections 78S and 78T below." CLA §78R(1).
"'See CLA §78R(8).
The CLA defines limited exceptions to the public registry requirement. CLA §78S
establishes a national security exception, which forbids information from being included in a
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that information is available to the public," 9 it does not provide for
prior consultation with affected parties. Thus, if the public registry
approach can be argued to be consistent with the consultation principle,
the approach would conform only to the most limited version of that
principle-a disclosure to affected parties about potentially adverse
environmental impacts, rather than an opportunity to consult in a
meaningful way on plans for action that may have significant adverse
consequences.
In sum, CERCLA adheres generally to the adequate
consultation principle. The extent to which the CLA can be said to
conform to the principle of adequate consultation depends significantly
on how the statutory provisions are implemented. On its face, the
statute cannot be said to conform to the principle.
IV. CLEANUP REGIMES AND THE NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
A. A Contextual Nondiscrimination Principle for National Law
As understood in the context of international environmental
law, the nondiscrimination principle ensures that a nation does not
subject foreign citizens to environmental risks to which the nation
would not expose its own citizens.' When applied for example to the
transboundary movement of hazardous waste, this principle ensures that
a nation requires that the exported waste meet the same standards for
safe transport and disposal that would apply if the waste were being
disposed of within the generating nation.'2' Applying the rationale of
this principle to national legislation, a nation should not expose parts of
register if"in the opinion of the Secretary of State, the inclusion in the register of that information,
or information of that description, would be contrary to the interests of national security." CLA
§78T(l) excludes confidential commercial information from the register of information related to
contaminated land. The determination that information is confidential is made by the enforcing
authority with an appeal available to the Secretary of State. Id. The enforcing authority is required
to permit an interested party to object that information that may be included in a register is
commercially confidential. Id. §78T(2). CLA §78T(10) defines an "unreasonable commercial
prejudice" standard for defining confidential information, with an exception regarding the impact
on the value of the contaminated land. Id. §78T(11). CLA §78T(7) provides, however, that the
Secretary of State may decide that the public interest trumps commercial confidentiality and
require that commercially confidential information be disclosed in a register.
.. CERCLA too requires that information about remediation be available to the public.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(b) (requiring that the final remediation plan be available for review); id. §
9613(k) (Requiring that an administrative record concerning selection of remediation be
maintained).
'See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 8, at 378-79; see also SANDS, supra note 8 at 197.
...See SANDS, supra note 8, at 493.
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its national population to environmental risks, when the nation would
not allow other groups within the national population to be subjected to
those same risks.
B. CERCLA's Cleanup Regime and the Nondiscrimination Principle
For the past decade, American environmental law has been
subjected to the criticism that it fails to meet a standard of
nondiscrimination, particularly because the law tolerates, if not
encourages, the imposition of enhanced risks on the urban poor, who
are disproportionately African-American. 22 CERCLA's program for
remediating releases of hazardous substances would not seem to raise
concerns about adherence to a nondiscrimination standard because its
cleanup standards apply uniformly and are intended to protect human
health against being exposed to the risks of harm from releases of
hazardous substances. 12' The high costs associated with ensuring
compliance with CERCLA's health-based cleanup standard have,
however, caused the development of alternative state cleanup
programs. 24 State programs facilitating the cleanup and redevelopment
of these so-called brownfields have sought to encourage cleanups by
offering a release from further liability when the state voluntary cleanup
is complete. 125 Because residual risks will very likely remain after such
a cleanup,126 the polluter will not have had to bear the burdensome costs
ofremediating the property to eliminate all nonnatural risks.' Cleanup
plans under these state brownfields programs are often developed
without an opportunity for participation and comment by the affected
and interested public. 2 State brownfields programs, which typically
are applied to sites that are not listed on the NPL, 129 reflect the view that
it is better for society to tolerate background risks posed by toxics and
nonpermanent remedies in order to promote commercial development
"2 See generally KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ANDJUSTICE:
READINGS AND COMMENTARY ONENVIRONMENTALLAWAND PRACTICE 133-36, 153-88(1995);
Kirsten H. Engel, Brownfields Initiatives and Environmental Justice: Second-Class Cleanups or
Market-Based Equity, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L 319 (1998).
'See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
'See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAW AND SOCIETY 921 (2d ed. 1998); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 39, at 13-15.
'See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 39, at 20,22 & 31-33.
...See id. at 35-38.
'See id. at 20-21 (describing voluntary cleanup incentive that results from reduced
(and predictable) costs of cleanup under state voluntary cleanup programs).
"'See id. at 43-45.
'See id. at 28-29.
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than it is to impose all of the direct and indirect costs of cleaning up
environmental hazards so that they pose no present or future increased
risk to health and the environment. 3
Thus, it is not remediation under CERCLA, but the fact that the
CERCLA regulatory regime has given way to alternate state regulatory
programs for the redevelopment ofbrownfields under voluntary cleanup
programs that has implicated the principle of nondiscrimination.'
State-created incentives for the development of typically-urban
brownfields"' by modifying cleanup standards and simplifying cleanup
procedures may mean that the residual risks to health and the
environment are being disproportionately borne by urban, African-
American communities. Moreover, unlike federal remediation under
CERCLA, voluntary cleanups under state brownfields programs may be
pursued without informing affected communities about residual risks
posed by the redeveloped site.'
Brownfields redevelopment and the state-law programs that
have been adopted to promote it raise at a national level the same
underlying issues regarding the cohesion of enviromnental standards
that the nondiscrimination principle raises at the international level. To
the extent residual risks are not permitted for NPL sites cleaned up
under CERCLA, it is unclear why such residual risks should be
permitted for cleaned-up, non-NPL brownfields sites. Regarding
cleanup procedures, it is unclear why CERCLA and the NCP dictate
significant public involvement requirements for federal cleanups, while
state voluntary cleanups may proceed in some contexts with very little
public involvement. The remediation of contaminated land is
"'Current differences in state and federal programs for cleaning up hazardous
substances in the United States appear to have the effect of establishing fully-protective property
rules for some affected groups and less-protective liability rules for other affected groups. Cf
Steele, supra note 6, at 631 (describing how the English standards for cleanups establish liability
rules, because the degree of required cleanup turns on market efficiency).
3'After reviewing several state voluntary cleanup programs, the General Accounting
Office suggested that EPA needed to provide more guidance and control regarding three key
program requirements: requisite cleanup standards, oversight of cleanups, and public participation
in cleanup planning. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 39, at 3545. This concern
about the potential discriminatory effects of state brownfields programs is addressed by Professor
Engel in this symposium. See Engel, supra note 122.
..mBrownfields are described as implicating principally urban areas in GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-96-125, SUPERFUND: BARRIERS TO BROWNFIELD
REDEVELOPMENT 4-5 (June 1996) ; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-172,
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: REUSE OF URBAN INDUsTRIAL SITEs 3-5 (June 1995).
t 3See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
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accordingly unlike other pollution prevention contexts'34 because the
federal standards here have not defined a floor for state environmental
protection standards and seem to permit discriminatory effects on
affected individuals.
In sum, as the CERCLA regulatory regime has come to be
implemented with differences between the requirements of CERCLA
and state voluntary cleanup programs, the regime is in tension with the
principal of nondiscrimination.
C. The CLA Cleanup Regime and Nondiscrimination
As defined by the statute, the CLA cleanup regime does not
appear to conflict with the nondiscrimination principle.' This national
scheme imposes uniform standards for remediation on contaminated
land. Although somewhat different requirements apply to special
sites, 36 the standard for defining special sites is also uniform.137
Moreover, although the federal authority exercises primary regulatory
control over special sites because they impose more serious risks to
public health and the environment, that authority is lost once the sites
no longer pose that enhanced risk and are deemed to be contaminated
land only. 3 '
Thus, CERCLA has permitted the development of two sets of
cleanup standards depending on the threats that the sites initially pose
to the public in their unremediated condition,'39 and these standards
may have discriminatory effects on the affected public. The CLA,
however, defines a uniform final cleanup standard for all contaminated
land. Although that standard may be critiqued because it is not
sufficiently responsive to the precautionary principle,' it is uniform
and thus not discriminatory in its impact on the affected public.
3'See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (permitting alternative state and local standards under the
Clean Water Act provided that they are not "less stringent" than the national standard); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7416 (same general provision under the Clean Air Act).
"'Because the statutory regime has not yet had the years of implementation as
CERCLA has had, it is premature to assess whether the CLA raises nondiscrimination concerns
as it has been applied.
"6See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
1371.
3'See supra notes 122-123 and 132 and accompanying text.
'"'See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
CERCLA and the CLA reflect different approaches to
addressing the problem of property contaminated by the improper
disposal of hazardous substances. CERCLA adheres more closely to
several key emerging principles of international environmental law,
specifically the precautionary principle, the polluter-pays principle and
the adequate consultation principle. Adherence with those principles
has resulted, however, in high compliance costs and has given rise to
alternative state cleanup programs. Those cheaper and less-protective
programs have undercut the extent to which the United States' program
for cleaning up contaminated land can be said to adhere to the
nondiscrimination principle.
The CLA, on the other hand, has established standards that on
their face do not conform as closely to the precautionary principle, the
polluter-pays principle and the adequate consultation principle. These
less protective standards do appear, however, to be applicable to all
citizens in a nondiscriminatory manner.
The alternative statutory schemes thus raise but do not answer
the question whether it is preferable to limit cleanup costs generally and
expose all citizens to residual risks or to allow the development of
different cleanup regimes, some of which expose local populations to
residual risks of exposure to hazardous substances.
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